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Chapter 9 
Some Yemeni Ideas About Human 
Rights 
Sheila Carapico 
Yemeni intellectuals voiced human rights concerns throughout the 
twentieth century. Of course, as elsewhere, the early incarnations of a 
human rights movement in this most populous corner of Arabia did not 
use the term huquq al-insan (human rights), popularized only in the 
1990s. Moreover, the emphasis was consistently on limiting arbitrary gov-
ernance and justice. Still, Yemenis tackled issues such as social equality, 
popular participation, judicial autonomy, due process, prison condi-
tions, and intellectual freedom, among others. This chapter explores 
how a fragmented yet tenacious intellectual movement grounded in 
indigenous political culture produced writings intended to breach 
authoritarianism for over half a century. Contemporary Yemeni human 
rights activism draws on Arab and/ or Islamic precedents and texts to 
articulate many of the principles expressed in international covenants. 
Concepts of human rights surfaced as intellectuals, jurists, and other 
political elites challenged tyranny and oppression, often in ways affected 
by Yemen's geographic position at the crossroads of Africa, Asia, and the 
Arab world, but always with reference to indigenous religious and soci-
etal values. Far from being some sort of alien 'Western construct super-
imposed on a Muslim Arab context, values now referred to collectively 
as human rights are deeplv woven into Yemeni political culture and 
scholarship. 
Rights are claims individuals or groups make on states. It is useflil to 
distinguish positive from negative rights, as in "freedom to" and "pro-
tection against." Political and civil rights, also known as citizen rights, 
first-generation rights, or bourgeois liberties, are often distinguished 
from the so-called second-generation or social and economic rights. The 
evolution of rights in Europe began when an emerging bourgeoisie 
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asserted privileges previously enjoyed only by the aristocracy. Eventually 
citizen rights became a cornerstone of the "social contract" between 
governments and the people they ruled, and complex codes evolved to 
guarantee freedoms of expression, participation, association, and the 
like, as well as protections against arbitrary justice or cruel treatment. 
These rights, then, are firmly entrenched in Euro-American political 
philosophy, and were the basis of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights issued after World War II and the covenants affirming socioeco-
nomic and collective rights of workers, women, and other social groups 
brought before the world in the 1960s and 1970s by socialist and Third 
World governments. These themes found their way into Yemeni writing 
and activism about the same time. 
Even before the infamous Abu Ghraib prison torture scandal, many 
Arabs rightly pointed to a double standard applied by ~Westerners to 
human rights abuses in the Middle East. European colonial sermons 
about human dignity and nonviolence masked sometimes ruthless prac-
tices. During the cold war era, officials, media, and independent groups 
in the United States and other NATO countries lambasted human rights 
abuses in the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, the People's 
Republic of (South) Yemen, and other states of socialist orientation, 
often simultaneously overlooking egregious offenses committed by 
friends and allies of the West. Yet all the while intellectuals and activists 
in Africa, Asia, Central Europe, and Latin America clamored for legal 
protections, political freedoms, and other rights. Apparent victories by 
rights activists from Moscow to Manila and from Berlin to Buenos Aires 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s emboldened journalists, attorneys, 
teachers, and others around the world. In the last decade of the twenti-
eth century, there was a deepening and widening of the international 
consensus on the universality of moral claims to basic protections and 
freedoms even as neoconservatives in the Arab world triumphed over a 
discredited Arab socialism. As we will see, in vociferous debates on good 
governance, Yemenis teased anticolonial, socialist, and liberal interna-
tionalist messages from the Arabic classics in which they were trained 
even as their own national history-British colonialism followed by 
Marxist revolution in the South and very gradual modernization in the 
North, culminating in unification in 1990-echoed world politics. 
Perhaps the most salient fin-de-siecle challenge to the universalization 
of human rights came from some Islamic leaders and thinkers who 
rejected international norms as another form of Occidental political 
and cultural interference. 1 Variously known as jihadi or salafi, these Mus-
lim scholars that claimed human rights as understood in the \Vest is anti-
thetical to Islam. Such "rejectionists," as a prominent Yemeni human 
rights advocate calls them,~ falsely claim to speak for all Muslims. Both 
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Western cultural essentialists and Islamist rejectionists typically frame 
the disjuncture in terms of a sort of universal Islamic law discerned from 
selected passages in the Qur'an, the Hadith, and various fatwa on 
shari'a, with such particular emphasis on dissonant matters of corporal 
punishment and family law that larger commonalities in ideas of justice 
and fairness are obscured. Less attention is given to Arab Muslim schol-
ars, jurists, journalists, and others whose \rnrks have defined, debated, 
and asserted legal and moral rights throughout the twentieth century. 
Some observers both in the Arab world and abroad automatically 
assume that human rights considerations are a product of Western 
influence. This chapter traces some of the high points in the develop-
ment of a human rights consciousness in a corner of the Arabian Penin-
sula relatively insulated from \".'estern influence since the British left 
Aden. My focus is on the exposition of human rights concepts and rea-
soning in some well-known Arabic documents and manuscripts by prom-
inent Yemeni scholars, jurists, and politicians. The articulation of 
human rights concepts does not translate automatically into implemen-
tation, of course, but is nonetheless probably an important prerequisite. 
Although the Ottomans established a few schools in North Yemen and 
the British trained some Adenis (of Indian or Somali as well as Yemeni 
parentage) for colonial administration, European educational influence 
was minimal in southwest Arabia. There were no Christian or colonial 
colleges, universities, or schools, so the intellectual elite were trained in 
classical Arabic and Islamic law, literature, and sciences. Even late in the 
twentieth century, only a fraction of professors, jurists, and writers were 
vVestern educated, others having studied in Cairo, Baghdad, Khartoum, 
Moscow, Prague, Bombay, or Singapore. At Sana'a and Aden Universi-
ties and in Yemeni schools, Egyptian, Iraqi, Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Suda-
nese influences were far more salient in most fields than European or 
American models. Overall, then, the intellectual conversations were 
framed in Arabic, with reference to Yemeni, Muslim, Arab legal tradi-
tions, informed by perspectives that were international without being 
vVestern. These conversations were grounded in the two main Yemeni 
sectarian traditions, Zaycli Shi'ism (technically, the Haclawi school), 
based in the large high plateau region around Sana'a, and the Shafi'i 
(Sunni) sect predominant along the Reel Sea and Arabian Sea/Indian 
Ocean coasts. Many writers referred explicitly or implicitly to the great 
seventeenth century Yemeni jurist Muhammad 'Ali al-Shawkani, whose 
political writings sought the common jurisprudential ground between 
Shafa'i and Zaydi precepts.' I take up this conversation in the early twen-
tieth century as Yemeni writers and activists criticized many traditional 
practices and advanced a series of proposals for "'sacred" or "national" 
charters guaranteeing citizen rights and limiting the powers of g<ffern-
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men ts. Although writings and even constitutional declarations were not 
translated into actual practice, there is evidence of widening and deep-
ening popular support for such a social contract to protect people from 
government. 
Reform Within Tradition 
The Arabian Peninsula, of course, was the cradle of Islam. At the dawn 
of the twentieth century, several different forms of Islamic law were in 
effect in different parts of the peninsula. The austere doctrine of Wah-
habism that formed the ideological basis of the emergent Saudi king-
dom was quite distinct from the Sunni Ottoman laws introduced in 
Yemen from Istanbul. The Zaydi Shi'ism of North Yemen's imams dif-
fered from the Ibadi Shi'ism of Omani imams, and the Shafi'i sultans 
of South Yemen's coastal region and Shafa'i scholars in North Yemen 
interpreted Sunni Islam in ways different from all of the above. These 
various schools of Islamic law held different positions on matters such 
as governance, taxation, education, and descent from the Prophet. (Sys-
tems of customary tribal law were also in effect in rural southern and 
central Arabia,) Each sect and polity trained jurists and legal scholars in 
its particular judicial and scholarly traditions. These were not stagnant 
but constantly developing interpretations and precedents. And within 
each polity, rulers attempted to impose central interpretations on aca-
demic training and judicial practice. 
The cliche that "in Islam there is no separation of church and state" 
obscures the potential and sometimes real independence of religious 
institutions including zakat (a tithe), waqf (endowment), religious edu-
cation, and judicial appointments and interpretations. Historically, vari-
ous imams and sultans asserted their prerogative to collect and expend 
the religious tithe on wealth and production, but Shafi'i and even Zaydi 
communities often resisted its centralization. Eventually tax farming, 
surcharges, and other abuses had distorted a pious obligation beyond 
recognition. Regimes further attempted to control the considerable 
wealth of waqf funds as well as the intellectual content of the institutes, 
libraries, and mosques they supported. In the mid-1920s, North Yemen's 
Imam Yahya redirected the resources ofShafa'i schools into pro-imamic 
Zaydi institutions that trained jurists and teachers in an effort to mold 
legal and scholarly opinions. In South Yemen, too, at least one of the 
Hadrami sultans transferred administration of a school funded from an 
endowment in Singapore out of the hands of local religious scholars 
who protested that their academic standards were compromised.' In 
short, state control of religious institutions and interpretations was 
always controversial. 
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A new generation of the educated elite that came of age in the 1920s 
and 1930s criticized the status quo'' and pressed for reforms that 
touched directly on what would later be considered human rights con-
cerns. Influenced by trends in Egyptian, Sudanese, and e\'en Indonesian 
education, North Yemeni liberals founded a couple of modern model 
schools, and an early Islamist reform movement in the Hadramawt 
defied the elite monopoly on reading and writing by educating the sons 
of ordinary tribesmen. Such schools became sites for the performance 
of ironic morality plays and the reading of political poetry. A range of 
Yemeni and foreign books and essays, many of them officially banned, 
circulated among the slowly expanding reading public. Themes of lib-
erty and justice echoed in literary production and reverberated the pun-
ishment for dissent. The al-Akwa' brothers in Ibb, the elder of whom 
was a jurist, teacher, and playwright, were arrested for participation in a 
Reform (Isiah) Society and sent to the infamous H;Ujah prison with 
other intellectualsY Detainees wrote pleas for leniency, conciliatory 
compositions to the imams, eulogies for slain colleagues, tributes to 
other scholars, poetry, history and works of protest or parody, and even 
issued two hand-written newspapers.' The famous Zaydi poet and jurist 
Muhammad al-Zubayri was exiled to Cairo for advocating a consultative 
imamate, and imprisoned on his return. Zubayri's writings, especially a 
1952 pamphlet entitled "The Demands of the People" and another 
called "The Imamate and Its Menace to Yemeni Unity," developed the 
ideas of popular sovereignty and individual rights and freedoms as an 
alternative to personalized rule. It was a wide-ranging polemic, denounc-
ing status differentiation, abuse of the religious tithe, and other injus-
tices.8 Muhsin al-'Ayni, another prominent republican, wrote a review of 
the Qur'anic account of the ancient Yemeni Queen Bilqis (the Queen 
of Sheba) to make the case that the original, Islamic, and true form of 
government was and ought to be a republic." Some other young scholars 
accused by the administration of altering the Qur'an were acquitted by 
a Sana'a appeals court judge-who, with colleagues, subsequently issued 
a legal brief challenging forced payment of zakat, uncanonical taxes, tax 
farming, and trade monopolies, and demanding the pardon of political 
exiles. 111 
One of the most important public documents of the prerevolutionary 
period was a Sacred National Charter published in Februarv 1948, 
wherein a group of mostly Zaydi religious scholars, some of whom had 
contacts in the Egyptian Muslim Brethren, called for modern constitu-
tional rule. The charter began by saying that "to safeguard the True 
Religion and Our Independence, the representatives of the Yemeni 
nation of the different classes have convened in the form of a Congress 
to discuss the matter of establishing a good and legal regime." It callee\ 
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for the immediate establishment of a constitutional Council to design a 
monarchy along the lines of those then in power in Egypt and Iraq, with 
a legislature elected via universal adult suffrage and including represen-
tatives of towns, tribes and provinces, and emigres. In the meantime, a 
seventy-person Consultative Council and a Council of Ministers should 
run things alongside an elected imam. 
Although the precise shape of government was left to be determined, 
Articles 27 through 32 called for certain kinds of rights: "Injustice and 
oppression of the subjects must be quickly abolished"; "Life and prop-
erty of all shall be assured"; "All the Yemen people shall be of the same 
level in respect of absolute equality"; "They shall be ruled according to 
true Moslem law, which shall be applied to all without any distinction." 
Moreover, "Freedom of opinion, speech, sufficiency (sic) and meeting" 
and freedom from "ignorance, poverty, and disease" were to be guaran-
teed.11 There was also a call for "connections with the civilized world." 
Issued ten months before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at the end of 
1948, the document unsurprisingly does not echo all its provisions, and 
it does have a couple of disconcerting phrases about punishment of trai-
tors. But it offers evidence that Yemeni intellectuals were conversant 
with contemporary pan-Arab and international discussions ofrights and 
freedoms. 
In 1955, Yemeni exiles in Cairo and Aden continued their constitu-
tional campaign, according to another republican writer, emphasizing 
"a bill of rights as a basis for the government. In a pamphlet they drew 
up a new proposed national pact based on the [universal] declaration 
of human rights." 12 In South Yemen, where Great Britain had colonized 
the port city and signed protectorate treaties with rural sultans, the 
issues were different. Inside Aden Colony, a bustling commercial hub 
and naval base, a full-fledged anticolonial struggle developed. Newspa-
pers representing a wide range of conservative, liberal, Arab nationalist, 
and socialist viewpoints stimulated political awareness and debate, per-
haps especially when colonial authorities shut them down. The concerns 
of disenfranchised Yemeni immigrants to the city were best represented 
by the trades unions. From the beginning, white-collar leaders of the 
Aden Trades Union Conference set out to draft a "constitution" and 
publish a newspaper-13 In 1958 the union newspaper was banned and its 
leaders arrested. Nevertheless an expanding syndical movement 
expanded and organized hundreds of strikes over the next decade to 
protest the absence of voting rights, inflation, and British actions else-
where in the Middle East. In response to these pressures, limited elec-
tions for a newly created Aden Legislative Council occurred in October 
1964 amid widespread political detentions and a ban on public meet-
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ings. Once elected, otherwise pro-British parliamentarians insisted on 
repeal of martial law, institution of universal adult suffrage, UN supervi-
sion of new elections, and respect for ordinary freedoms. 
Colonial officers blamed widespread popular opposition to their 
administration on either cultural traditions (Islam and tribalism) or out-
side influences (Ottomans, and later Nasirites or Yemeni republicans). 
To stem the rising tide of dissent, authorities resorted to raiding meet-
ings, rounding up activists, torturing some of them in prison, and block-
ing the International Red Cross and Amnesty International from visiting 
Adeni prisons. 14 In other respects, too, the U nitecl Kingdom established 
an unfortunate precedent for violating fundamental rights. Even before 
the onset of the armed struggle, nonviolent partisan leaders were jailed. 
Repeatedly, protests turned into riots when police and soldiers aimed 
their weapons into crowds. Suspected rabble-rousers were rounded up, 
sometimes by the dozen and sometimes by the hundreds, and then vari-
ously released, tried, or deported. 1' 
In those clays there were evidently no human rights or legal aid socie-
ties, but there were scattershot efforts to defend legal and civil liberties. 
Detentions and deportations were the proximate cause of many work 
stoppages. Resorting to a technique used in India, 15 of 107 jailed 
unionists staged a hunger strike in 1963. Students marched, and politi-
cal detainees penned letters, poems, memoranda, satire, and petitions. 
Adeni authorities protested martial law. Essayists, theorists, and journal-
ists broadcast defied censors with broadcasts and pamphlets. Yemeni 
intellectuals were in touch with the United Nations, Red Cross, and 
Amnesty International. Under the umbrella of the call for the right to 
self~cletermination were a number of specific demands for due process 
and intellectual license. 
The constitutional movement gained momentum in the 1960s. Antici-
pating a future quite different from the past, intellectuals in both North 
and South Yemen put forth new constitutional proposals at popular con-
ferences. In 'Amran, north of Sana'a, a group of republicans and tribal 
leaders drew up a list of demands calling on the Egyptian-dominated 
North Yemeni military regime to create an executive council and a con-
sultative council including tribal leaders. Rebuffed, they called a second 
meeting, chaired by the nationalist al-Zubairi and attended by sheikhs 
of both royalist and republican leanings. The 'Amran resolutions reiter-
ated earlier proposals and called for committees to resolve tribal dis-
putes.I'' In a somewhat parallel development in one South Yemeni 
Protectorate, a tribally organized group called the Yafa' Reform Front 
that mediated local conflicts by employing common law mechanisms 
such as collecting rifles from each party to a dispute also advanced a 
"free Yafa' constitution." 17 
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In 1965, a larger, more inclusive conference brought traditional and 
modern scholars from throughout North Yemen to Khamir, north of 
'Amran, in the tribal heartland. Whereas previously the civilian liberal-
republican literature had articulated mainly urban intellectual perspec-
tives, now the concerns of ranchers, farmers, and villagers were 
reflected. The "provisional constitution," sometimes called the Khamir 
constitution, issued by this conference drew upon the 'Amran docu-
ment, the earlier Sacred National Pact, common law notions of local 
self-governance, and some liberal language in an explicit effort to cast a 
wide net. One clause stated that "All Yemenis are equal in rights and 
responsibilities," and named among the rights justice, education, and 
association .18 
During this same time period, South Yemeni partisans held their own 
conferences, once in Beirut and later (after 1962) inside North Yemen. 
The most historic of these was the first conference of the National Liber-
ation Front (NLF) in Taiz in 1965, where a national charter was pre-
sented. In formulating its ideological positions, the NLF intellectual 
leaders drew on the populist egalitarianism of the early Islamist reform-
ers and the Aden trade union movement, as well as on Nasserism, the 
Arab Nationalist Movement, and international socialism. Its program 
was radical by any standards, calling for "complete economic liberation 
from foreign exploiting capitalism" and elimination of the rule of 
"agent reactionary sultans." The charter further proposed "to restore 
their natural rights to women, and their equality with men ... thus pro-
viding the basis for human justice and giving women the position in life 
to which they are entitled as full participants." 19 
Human Rights Promises and Abuses 
To this point, then, alternative political elites developed some of the lan-
guage, concepts, and principles of political rights and liberties. This dis-
course was idealist rather than realist: the power of the pen, not the 
power of the gun. New regimes promised these ideals would become 
governing principles. In the 1960s and early 1970s, when Free Officers 
and the National Liberation Front respectively came to power, constitu-
tions were issued acknowledging many rights. The North Yemen (the 
Yemen Arab Republic, YAR) 1963 provisional constitution, the first of 
several documents reflecting Egyptian models, specified equality before 
the law, due process, and property and labor rights. Revisions in 1964 
added freedom of opinion, press freedom, and the right to unionize. 
The 1970 "permanent" constitution (suspended in a 1974 military 
coup) further emphasized scholarly and press freedoms. Article 42 
called for policies recognizing "human [or perhaps humane] rights 
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common to all humanity on an equal basis" ["al-huquq al-insaniyya l'al-
bashar jami'yan b-safa mutasawiyya"], with specific mention of the rights 
of women, children, the aged, the infirm, prisoners, and exiles; and of 
nondiscrimination on the basis of religion, color, or gender. 2" The 1978 
Southern constitution, drawing on Socialist as well as Arab models, 
explicitly mentioned the International Declaration, and further speci-
fied a rather long list of social and economic rights for all citizens. 21 The 
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) also practiced "state 
feminism," promoting women's education, employment, and political 
representation, issuing a progressive family law, and eventually signing 
the Convention to Eliminate Discrimination against Women. 22 Although 
the two Yemeni governments advertised different kinds of rights, it can 
be inferred from their pronouncements that successive regimes in both 
Sana'a and Aden believed that the enunciation of basic rights would bol-
ster their domestic and/ or international legitimacy. 
Unfortunately, the regimes in the PDRYand the YAR, were (to put it 
bluntly) both unstable Third World dictatorships that did not live up to 
these proclamations. Post-imamic and postcolonial policies did elimi-
nate the status differentiation of old, suspend hated tax practices, expel 
royal families from power, and recognize Yemeni citizenship. But prog-
ress toward the full realization of basic rights and liberties called for by 
reformists and revolutionaries was negligible. Notwithstanding the con-
trasts between socialist "law and order" in the PDRY and the North's 
"chaotic capitalism," national security forces operated beyond constitu-
tional or judicial constraints in both systems. Grave atrocities were com-
mitted during and after the Southern revolution, and inside Aden, 
especially, the group that evolved from the NLF into the Yemeni Social-
ist Party controlled political activity tightly. Because every new regime 
issued a new list of state criminals, securitv prisons remained full even 
after the periodic amnesties. Fifteen hundred people were detained 
after Aden's intraparty bloodbath in 1986, and much was made of the 
political trials of a hundred traitors. Whereas the YAR permitted the Red 
Cross to inspect its admittedly medieval and rat-infested jails, the Aden 
regime, like its colonial predecessor, denied reporters access to its 
detention centers. 
Sana'a's military regimes and an increasingly perYasive security appa-
ratus also suppressed dissent, open political organizing, and flow of 
information. Moreover, by the mid-l 980s a new, right-wing sort of Islam-
ism was spreading in North Yemen and among emigres to the Gulf. This 
movement had its intellectual legacy in puritanical \Nahhabism as taught 
in Saudi-financed religious schools established throughout the Muslim 
world at the height of the oil boom. Its militancv was cultivated for the 
Afghan anti-Soviet jihad. As instructed to Yemeni immigrants lw Saudi 
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preachers, to Yemeni students by fundamentalist Egyptian and Sudanese 
teachers, and to volunteer mttjahideen training in Pakistan, this "born-
again" fundamentalism put greatest emphasis on the elements of shari'a 
that seem most antithetical to international conceptions of human 
rights, such as hyperseclusion of women, corporal punishment, and 
hatred of infidels. With Gulffunding and government support, the intel-
lectual wing of this movement gained a slew of influential positions at 
Sana'a University, where a sociology professor was branded an apostate 
for "blasphemous" writings, a bare-headed woman was assaulted, and 
self-appointed zealots policed male-female encounters. By the late 
1980s, a reformist movement was taking shape in Aden. Show trials fol-
lowing the shootout in 1986 became a forum for legal defense of politi-
cal dissent. Constraints on speech, press, association, and movement 
were loosened. The impetus for this tentative but unmistakable liberal-
ization evidently came from within and beyond the party. Leading social-
ist intellectual, Jar Allah 'Umar began urging the ruling Yemeni Socialist 
Party toward pluralism (ta'addudiyya), human rights (huquq al-insan), cit-
izen rights, freedom of intellectual pursuits, and other liberties. As a first 
step, intellectuals, businessmen, and popular organizations should be 
engaged in the ongoing constitutional and unity negotiations. In view 
of perestroika in the USSR, the events of January 1986 in the PDRY, and 
religious currents in the YAR, he argued, it was time for tolerance of 
opposition parties and relaxation of restrictions on the press. A new 
elections law relaxed nomination and polling supervision and redrew 
constituency lines.2:1 To one American diplomat, there seemed to be a 
"tacit agreement" within the ruling party to allow "freer journalistic 
expression" as well as "the first stirrings of political demonstrations and 
strikes. " 24 
Contemporary Discourses 
The language of human rights began to permeate national political dis-
courses in many languages and settings around 1990. Yemeni unifica-
tion in 1990 ushered in a new era of unprecedented, if still hardly 
unfettered, freedom of association, expression, publication, and move-
ment. For the first time, political parties campaigned in contested elec-
tions. A constitution drafted (nearly a decade earlier) by a committee of 
the nation's best jurists, adopted in popular referendum in 1991, 
offered a significant bill of rights and promised a democratic form of 
government. In addition to universal adult suffrage, the constitution 
guaranteed "freedom of thought and expression by speech, writing, or 
pictures within the law," "equal treatment" without discrimination due 
to "sex, color, racial origin, language, occupation, social status, or reli-
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gious beliefs," and the presumption of "innocent until proven guilty." 
Political rights including freedom of association "inasmuch as it was not 
contrary to the constitution" were also affirmed. There were fewer mili-
tary checkpoints, a number of political detainees were released, and 
many exiles returned home. All the political tendencies from the previ-
ous generation of activism surfaced, from the socialist left through vari-
ous brands of Arab nationalism to liberal globalism to different sorts of 
Islamism. In one way or another, each and every significant political ten-
dency adopted the discourse-perhaps one should say the rhetoric-of 
human rights. 
Several socialist and independent progressive intellectuals, especially 
those involved with the Yemeni Writers Union, had introduced the term 
"human rights" into political debate even before 1990 as part of a plea 
for tolerance. Northern and Southern educators, journalists, and attor-
neys from the liberal-left were well represented among the first group to 
meet to found what later came to be called the Yemeni Organization for 
the Defense of Human Rights and Democratic Liberties (ODHRDL) in 
the early 1990s.~'' Professors introduced human rights curricula at 
Sana'a University and penned editorials on the subject. From the intel-
lectual elite, there was some trickle-down as students and others formed 
branches of Amnesty International. Indeed, rather quickly, the language 
of rights spread across the full political spectrum. The platform of the 
party organization that had ruled North Yemen and was still rightly 
called the ruling party, the General People's Congress (GPC), made 
"citizen rights in freedom, equality, and justice" a leading principle.~'; A 
second association called the Yemeni Organization for Human Rights 
(YOHR) was founded by members of the two major parties on the right, 
the GPC and the Reform Party.~7 Although this group sacrificed some 
credibility to a blatant security presence in their midst, it nonetheless 
signified a widening of the discourse of human rights, in recognition of 
the wide popular appeal of notions of liberty, justice, and nonviolence. 
The YOHR leadership included at least one prominent traditionally 
educated judge, Hamud al-Hitar, who familiarized himself with and 
encouraged others to read international covenants. YOHR's first aim 
was to "promote greater respect for human rights and liberties as out-
lined in shari'a, current legislation, the International Statement on 
Human Rights in Islam the International Declaration on Human 
Rights, and in Arab, Isla;nic, and international charters, conventions 
and agreements."~" Other stated objectives were equality; the pursuit of 
liberty; protections against violence and surveillance; judicial and penal 
reform; and attention to the rights of "·omen and children under 
shari'a. Like ODHDRL, YOHR published investigations of prison condi-
tions in the many weekly newspapers then "·ide!y available. 
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Notions of political liberties and legal protections were widely dis-
cussed among the political elite. Although exercising unprecedented 
editorial leeway with the suspension of prior censorship, newspapers 
were sued by the Ministry of Information in Sana' a for a range of alleged 
misdemeanors. Journalists and attorneys, enjoying newfound possibili-
ties for non-civil service careers, animated their syndicates to defend the 
reporters and editors from various charges. Publicity for these cases, 
some of which have attracted the attention of international organiza-
tions to protect freedom of the press, 2" was another occasion for the 
articulation oflegal principles. So much did the discussion of protection 
of human rights catch on, in fact, that in the months leading up to the 
1994 civil war an experienced foreign human rights investigator worried 
privately that "human rights has become a stick both sides [GPC and 
socialists] beat each other with." Some citizens, perhaps a majority, 
doubted the sincerity of political leaders' rhetorical commitment to 
basic protections and freedoms. By the same token, there is no doubt 
that the term "human rights" was bandied about in ruling circles as well 
as by popular organizations because of its widespread appeal. 
On the far right, the most puritanical wing of the Islamist tendency~" 
has tailored a notion of "Islamic human rights" to a particular political 
agenda.~ 1 Most conspicuously, neo-Islamists advanced a separate notion 
of "women's rights": women and girls have rights to separate education 
and work spaces, to be supported by their male kinfolk, to travel with an 
escort, and so on. Thus restrictions are portrayed as rights. Inequalities 
under legislation introduced in the mid-1990s assert women's inferior 
capacity to serve as witnesses in court, mandate lower inheritance for 
sisters than for brothers, insist on spousal obedience, and tolerate polyg-
amy and unilateral divorce by husbands but not wives. But even at the 
extreme fringe of the post-Afghanistan, radically antisocialist fundamen-
talist movement, Yemeni neo-Islamists were not questioning whether 
women have citizen rights. They recognized that women must be free 
from family or state violence and forced marriage and are entitled to 
participate in parliamentary elections, hold public office, and press con-
tractual obligations in court.:12 In the lead-up to the 1993 parliamentary 
elections, the Reform Party organized the first ever nationwide cam-
paign to register women voters. Feminine voluntarism, for instance, con-
cerning human rights violations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, and 
Kashmir is encouraged.:n The neofundamentalists-among them some 
fully veiled spokeswomen-insisted that women and men should all be 
educated in their rights under shari'a and that female illiteracy is a 
major barrier to protection of women's legal rights. At the center and 
left of the political spectrum, many authors writing within Islamic or civil 
law frameworks contradicted the rejectionists. A number of authors 
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deduced rights principles from an Islamic, Arab notion of what it is to 
be human, citing both moral principles and legal doctrine. Only a few 
of these can be cited here. Muhammad 'Abd al-Malik al-Mutawakkil 
refuted the "rejectionist" perspective by quoting from Qur'anic, schol-
arly, and Saudi sources on the major issues on which Islam is sometimes 
said to conflict with the Universal Declaration: freedom of belief, gender 
equality, inheritance, polygamy, and female legal competence. In an 
essay for the Sana'a official daily newspaper, Ahmad al-Manvani traced 
the idea of human rights to the ancient Yemeni kingdom of Ma' en, the 
ancient Greeks, and the Qur'an." Zayd al-\Vazir philosophically recon-
ciled Zaydi political theory with internationally-recognized precepts of 
democracy and human rights.:'°' A prominent politician and benefactor 
of a scholarly foundation, Ahmad Jabir 'Afif, published a long essay on 
women's rights using both civil and religious law precedents to demon-
strate governmental obligations to equal treatment before the law,:i,; and 
legal scholar Ahmad al-Wa<la'i's controversial analysis of North Yemeni 
constitutional and legal documents emphasized the legal obligation to 
protections consistent with international standards.:17 Several other legal 
histories and countless editorials expounded on these notions. 
The many pleas of human rights activists seemed to fall on deaf ears 
as Northern and Southern armies squared off in the winter and spring 
of 1994. As in earlier national moments of crisis, political elites joined 
together to try to write a social contract. The National Dialogue of Politi-
cal Forces was a committee of three members from each of the leading 
parties, one from each of a half-dozen prominent lesser parties and the 
opposition coalition, and several independents, a total of twenty-seven 
men, all with national reputations, selected to represent every m<tjor 
region and social group from within the body politic. University faculty, 
legal scholars, journalists, and others seized the opportunity to present 
their research in the many seminars arranged to discuss subjects like the 
line between censorship and libel, women's rights, and shari'a. Excerpts 
and full transcripts of these symposia appeared in the popular press, 
thus influencing wider discourse and ordinary conversation. At the pop-
ular level, a score of regional conferences involved tens of thousands of 
people, mostly but not all men, in the national dialogue. Protection of 
human rights was among the resolutions of mass meetings in cities and 
towns across the country. The most common themes overall were public 
safety, removal of the military from population centers, elections for 
local administration, judicial independence, a serious plan to limit gm·-
ernment corruption, and the building of modern state institutions. 
These issues in turn were incorporated into the accords issued by the 
Dialogue Committee on January 18, 1994. i" 
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The document opened with a set of proposals to curtail the roles of 
security forces and the interior and defense ministries in politics and 
policing. These immediate "law and order" concerns were to be fol-
lowed up through provisions for the independence of the judiciary, for 
separation of armed forces from criminal prosecution, and for ministe-
rial, parliamentary, and civilian control of the security establishment. In 
the remainder of the accords, three major modifications of the current 
constitutional order were called for: a bicameral legislature, a limited 
executive, and decentralization. Support for these constitutional princi-
ples was widespread. Amid gathering war clouds, more conferences 
affirmed the work of the Dialogue Committee and their proposals. 
Urban scholars, attorneys, and other professionals held weekly seminars 
to examine each section of the document. In meetings from Sa'adah in 
the far north to Lahij and Hadramawt in the south there were calls for 
prompt, full implementation of the Accords. Members of the Dialogue 
Committee now met in Sana'a, Aden, Taiz, and elsewhere to plan a strat-
egy of regular, peaceful, sit-in protests in cities and towns throughout 
the country, Ample coverage of these events in the partisan press 
showed how the GPC, Socialists, Reform Party, and other parties each 
tried to associate themselves with a movement that clearly represented 
majority public sentiment.~" 
War erupted between the two former armies, however, and human 
rights suffered as a consequence. A security crackdown accompanied 
the three-month state of emergency,40 and subsequently the victorious 
Sana'a government (a wartime alliance of the GPC and the conservative 
Reform Party) sponsored constitutional amendments and legislation 
that threatened human rights by strengthening executive authority, 
retracting women's legal competence, eroding judicial autonomy, and 
constraining other rights and guarantees of rights. As a number of intel-
lectuals were interred or beaten up and honest judges found themselves 
in obscure rural courts, the challenges to the weakened nascent human 
rights movement were formidable indeed. 11 Members of the Dialogue 
Committee outside the ruling coalition, including Abu Bakr al-Saqqaf, 
Anis Hassan Yahya, and Omar al-:Jawi, charged the regime with disregard 
for human rights. 4~ Even six years after the civil war, facing no significant 
domestic security threat, the administration persisted in harassment of 
independent newspapers, judges, associations, and opinion leaders. 
While the political security organization seemed ever-vigilant, ordinary 
crimes often escaped prosecutors' attention. 
Still, as Naguib A. R. Shamiry of the Supreme Judicial Council 
observed, Yemen was bound by its signature to thirteen international 
human rights covenants and instruments. In principle, the courts were 
constitutionally charged with upholding human rights in a number of 
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ways, including presumption of innocence, protections against unwar-
ranted search, right to legal defense, prohibition of torture and forced 
confessions, and punishment commensurate with the crime.43 There 
were at least some indications that the regime was conscious of these 
obligations. After the war the victors said they had fought for unity and 
the values of "democracy, political pluralism, freedom of the press and 
respect of human rights."!! In 1998, the National High Committee for 
Human Rights in Yemen, established some years earlier, declared 10 
December National Human Rights Day.4' The president of the republic 
himself, in the opening address at a human rights day conference in 
December 1999, reiterated the national commitment to guarantee citi-
zens their rights. Iii His ere party's \\'eb page contains a strong state-
ment of the goal to "protect and preserve human rights and public 
freedoms." 17 
Official statements may well be purely rhetorical pronouncements for 
foreign public relations purposes, since it is clear that practice does not 
live up to rhetoric.'" But politicians across the political spectrum seemed 
to recognize the popular appeal of this discourse as well. Awareness was 
higher than ever at the end of the twentieth century, especially within 
the growing legal community. Just as civil society institutions may pro-
tect political pluralism, wrote Ahmad al-Wada'i, the courts were the 
guarantors of human rights and liberties; both zones are highly politi-
cized, and the protection of rights proceeds both through individual 
cases and in larger efforts to secure judicial autonomy. 4 ' 1 In terms of 
Yemeni culture, argued attorney Muhammad N;tji 'Alaw, there is both a 
philosophical tradition of judicial independence and a history of politi-
cal attempts to bend legal practice to the imperatives of governing 
authorities.''" Research showed that, despite many obstacles, members of 
the judiciary did attempt to exercise their constitutional function in the 
protection of the law.'' 1 Under a program conceptualized by an Egyptian 
teacher with help from the British Council, there was even a project 
called Children Painting Their Rights, involving students from thirty-six 
schools in five provinces in publicity for the rights of children.''~ In the 
mid-2000s, a traditionally trained jurist, Judge Harnud al-Hi tar, earned 
international attention by training jailed neo-Islamist militants in a 
learned reading of the Islamic rules of war that prohibits targeting of 
ciYilians.'"' 
In conclusion, then, "human rights" was not an alien concept intro-
duced into southwestern Arabia by Euro-American influences, but an 
ideal that has evolved endogenously and continues to develop as Yeme-
nis reconsider the nature of law and its implementation. This conversa-
tion, reflected in essays, constitutional proposals, legal briefs, and the 
press, has been influenced by international movements, ideologies, and 
declarations. It has also invoh'erl a fair number of citizens, over the years, 
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in constitutional conventions and popular conferences. Although I have 
by no means reviewed all the literature or explored specific legislative 
developments, in ongoing constitutional debates ideas of "freedom to" 
and "protection from" were steadily refined and expanded. It is simply 
wrong, or a wrongful simplification, to represent this as a polarization 
between traditionalists and modernists or Islamic versus Western values, 
for we have seen a range of political perspectives weigh in on human 
rights issues. Moreover, there is nothing traditional about the neo-Islam-
ist rejection of "human rights;" many Yemenis searched their own intel-
lectual heritage for legal, moral, and logical support for international 
conceptions of human rights. If rights are not respected, it is not 
because traditions and values stand in the way but because actual prac-
tices do not stand up to stated, widely held ideals. 
